The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame by Fritz, Kyle G & Miller, Daniel J
Faculty & Staff Scholarship 
2019 
The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame 
Kyle G. Fritz 
Daniel J. Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/faculty_publications 
Ergo AN OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.019 545
Contact: Kyle Fritz <kgfritz@olemiss.edu>, Daniel Miller <daniel.miller2@mail.wvu.edu>
The Unique Badness of  
Hypocritical Blame
K Y L E  G . F R I T Z
University of Mississippi
D A N I E L  J . M I L L E R
West Virginia University
It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. 
According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame 
some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with 
respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Ma-
calester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet ex-
plain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. She raises a challenge: one must 
explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer 
lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those 
writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge. Recently, 
however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account 
can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately address-
es Bell’s challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical 
blame. Because answering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible 
account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains 
the best on offer.
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It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame (Fritz & Miller 2018; Isserow & Klein 2017; Roadevin 2018; Todd 2019; 
Wallace 2010). According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the 
standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is 
not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N.
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While this condition is often taken for granted, it is seldom argued for. The 
fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame 
is standingless blame. As Macalester Bell issues the challenge:
People may, and frequently do, evince a wide variety of moral faults 
through their blame: they can show meanness, pettiness, stinginess, ar-
rogance, and so on. But while people may manifest hypocrisy and other 
faults in their critical interventions, there is no reason to conclude that 
these faults always undermine a person’s standing to blame. (2013: 275)
In other words, not all moral faults undermine one’s standing to blame. In order 
to show that hypocrisy can, then, it is not sufficient to explain that hypocrisy is 
morally objectionable in some way. Rather, one must explain what is distinct 
about hypocrisy such that being hypocritical with respect to blame can under-
mine one’s standing to blame, even if these other faults do not.
While all of the authors who maintain the Nonhypocrisy Condition offer an 
account of the morally objectionable nature of hypocrisy, nearly all fail to offer 
the explanation required to meet Bell’s challenge in a clear and satisfying way. 
Indeed, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge (Fritz & Miller 2018). 
Recently, however, our account has come under criticism, both directly from 
Cristina Roadevin and Patrick Todd, as well as indirectly from Jessica Isserow 
and Colin Klein. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms 
and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell’s challenge of ex-
plaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because an-
swering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of 
the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best 
on offer.
1. The Dispositional Equality of Persons View
We directly address Bell’s challenge, offering a clear argument for why being 
hypocritical with respect to blame undermines the moral standing, or right, to 
blame.1 On our view, being hypocritical with respect to blame is a matter of hav-
ing an unfair differential blaming disposition (UDBD)— having a disposition to 
blame others for a violation of some norm N but lacking a disposition to blame 
oneself for violations of N without having a justifiable reason for this differ-
1. We understand the moral standing to blame as a matter of having a non- defeated right to 
blame (2018).
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ence (2018: 122).2 In what follows, we will use the term “would- be hypocritical 
blame” as shorthand for having this type of UDBD. We will use the term “ac-
tual hypocritical blame” to refer to manifestations of this type of UDBD. It is not 
always clear how other writers are using their terminology. To avoid misrepre-
senting these authors’ views, we will use the more generic term hypocritical blame 
to refer either to having the relevant disposition or to blaming hypocritically 
(where other authors may have their own account of what the latter comes to).
On our view, the reason why would- be hypocritical blame undermines one’s 
standing to blame is that in having a UDBD, the hypocrite (implicitly) rejects the 
impartiality of morality and, consequently, the equality of persons with respect 
to blaming for violations of N, which is what grounds the right to blame for vio-
lations of N in the first place. We present our argument as follows (2018: 125):3
1.  If R is hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N, then R has 
a UDBD with respect to violations of N.
2.  If R has a UDBD with respect to violations of N, then R rejects the im-
partiality of morality with respect to violations of N.
3.  If R rejects the impartiality of morality with respect to violations of N, 
then R rejects the equality of persons with respect to violations of N.
4.  If R rejects the equality of persons with respect to violations of N, then 
R rejects the grounding that gives R the right to blame S for violations 
of N.
5.  If R rejects the grounding that gives R the right to blame S for viola-
tions of N, then R forfeits the right to blame S for violations of N.
So,
6.  If R is hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N, then R 
forfeits the right to blame S for violations of N.
Premise 1 follows from our understanding of what it means to be hypocritical 
with respect to blame. Premise 2 is rooted in a reasonable understanding of what 
the impartiality of morality requires: if one is unfairly disposed to blame differ-
entially for a norm violation, one cannot accept that morality is impartial with 
respect to that norm violation. By having the hypocritical UDBD, one makes an 
2. We do not use the abbreviation UDBD in our 2018 paper, but instead talk of DBDs more 
generally. Because unfair DBDs are the sort that undermine standing, we are concerned only with 
unfair DBDs, which we here call UDBDs for clarity.
3. We have modified the argument for clarity by replacing “DBD” with “UDBD.” Given that 
the purpose of our 2018 paper is to show how being hypocritical with respect to blame undermines 
standing, we have also clarified premise 1 and the conclusion to refer to “blame for violations of N.” 
For a fuller defense of the argument, see Fritz & Miller (2018: 126– 127).
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exception of oneself, implying that morality applies differently to one. But as 
premise 3 expresses, this exception- making involves an implicit rejection of the 
claim that we are all morally equal as persons.
The moral equality of persons, like the impartiality of morality, is a corner-
stone of morality. It is also a cornerstone of our argument, as we hold that the 
right to blame is rooted in the moral equality of persons. Our argument for this 
claim relies on two key steps: first, that there are certain rights that every person 
has (among these the right to blame), and second, that the best explanation of 
why persons have these rights is that they have them in virtue of their person-
hood.
We take it as a fundamental principle of ethics that every person has certain 
basic obligations and rights: we have obligations to respect each other, for in-
stance, and corresponding rights to be respected. If persons have any rights at 
all, and such rights are equally possessed by all persons, then the equal posses-
sion of basic moral rights among persons can be grounded only in something 
that explains the relevant equality. The best explanation for the equal possession 
of these basic moral rights is precisely that we are all persons, each of us having 
equal moral worth.
Yet we hold that the right to blame others is a basic moral right; more pre-
cisely, we each have the defeasible right to hold others accountable by blaming 
for norm violations, and this is in virtue of being a person.4 Our reasoning for 
this is slightly less direct; we see no grounding for the right to blame other than 
our equal, shared personhood. If the right to blame is basic, as we maintain, 
then having that right does not depend upon anything else other than being a 
person.
Any objection to the effect that there may (for all we know) be some alter-
native grounding for the right to blame would require an explanation that is at 
least as plausible as the equality of persons. As far as we are aware, no alterna-
tives have been offered. Yet we will examine two potential alternatives. By re-
flecting upon these alternative suggestions for what might ground the right to 
blame, we will not only eliminate these alternatives as candidates for this role, 
we will actually find a further, positive reason to support our view.
One might suggest that the right to blame is grounded, not merely in being 
a person, but in being a person with a virtuous character. We often either dismiss 
or rebuke those who are less than virtuous when they blame, as though blaming 
involves at least the pretense that one is taking the moral high ground, adopting 
4. Importantly, because this right is defeasible, this view does not entail that every person has 
the right to blame anyone in any situation. For example, the fact that S’s moral fault is none of R’s 
business may undermine R’s right to blame S. Although we sometimes write loosely of “lacking a 
right to blame,” this should be understood to mean that one’s right to blame (with respect to some 
norm violation) is defeated.
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a condescending attitude, or implicitly demanding respect. Perhaps those who 
lack a virtuous character are not entitled to such a position, so it is false that the 
right to blame is a basic right all persons have.
This suggestion may seem plausible in part because lacking a virtuous char-
acter and lacking the right to blame often go hand in hand. The less than virtu-
ous person may often be a hypocritical blamer, having done what he blames 
others for without being disposed to blame himself for it. But lacking a virtuous 
character and lacking the right to blame can come apart. For example, in January 
of 2019, an electrical fire caused a power outage to the Metropolitan Detention 
Center in Brooklyn, and the warden did not restore power for a week. Prison-
ers were left to suffer through temperatures as low as 2°F (Correal & Goldstein 
2019). These prisoners, even if guilty of criminal activity, have the right to be-
come angry at the warden. Lacking virtue does not entail that one lacks the right 
to blame for anything.
Alternatively, one might suggest that the right to blame someone derives, 
not merely from being a person, but from being in a special relationship with 
that person. Friendships, romantic relationships, and business relationships are 
partly constituted by various norms and expectations (see Scanlon 2008: Ch. 4). 
These may include expectations that one will provide help to the other in times 
of need, that one will keep confidences, that one will in general seek to further 
the interests of the other (rather than their harm), and so on. When one person 
in a special relationship wrongs another by violating or failing to meet one of 
these expectations, we do not believe that just anyone has the moral standing to 
respond to the wrongdoer with blame. Rather, it is the person who was wronged 
who is (all else equal) entitled to respond with blame.
This suggestion has some initial plausibility, since a person’s right to blame 
for some fault seems to depend upon the fault’s being that person’s business. Be-
ing a member of a special relationship who was wronged by the other member 
of that relationship quite straightforwardly makes it one’s business. Ultimately, 
however, this suggestion cannot be correct, since we at least sometimes have 
the standing to blame people with whom we have no special relationship.5 If a 
stranger shoves you out of his way while walking down the street, for example, 
you have the right to blame him for doing so. But you have no special relation-
ship with that person; there are no special norms or expectations that he has 
violated in wronging you.
One might respond by pointing out that your right to blame the stranger 
still depends upon a special relationship— the moral relation. As Scanlon writes, 
“morality requires that we hold certain attitudes toward one another simply in 
5. See George Sher’s (2013) critique of Scanlon’s view for an extended discussion of this prob-
lem.
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virtue of the fact that we stand in the relation of ‘fellow rational beings’” (2008: 
140). You stand in the moral relation with all fellow persons in virtue of your 
shared personhood, and there are certain norms and expectations that you hold 
for your interactions with every other person, such as treating each person with 
respect, not harming others, helping them when it is easy, etc. (2008: 140). It is in 
virtue of this relationship, one might argue, that you have the (defeasible) stand-
ing to blame strangers.
Perhaps this is right, but if so, it would only offer further positive support 
for our view. For, what this response amounts to is the idea that we have the 
defeasible right to blame anyone (including strangers) because of a relationship 
that we have with everyone that is grounded merely in the fact that we are all 
persons. So, in a sense, we want to hold that the defeasible right to blame others is 
grounded in a kind of relationship. But the relationship is not a special one that 
only some of us bear to one another. Rather, it is the relationship we have with 
everyone merely in virtue of the equality of persons.
By rejecting the equality of persons with respect to some norm violation, one 
rejects the very thing that grounds that right, and thereby implicitly forfeits the 
right to blame for violations of that norm. This holds whether the blame in ques-
tion is expressed to the agent blamed, expressed to a third party, or is private in 
nature (such as engaging in an internal diatribe or experiencing reactive moral 
anger). Furthermore, this holds prior to any such blame, in virtue of one’s UDBD. 
That one’s blame would be hypocritical, given one’s UDBD, explains why one 
lacks the standing to blame.
We provide a powerful explanation for why would- be hypocritical blame 
undermines moral standing with respect to some norm violation, thereby an-
swering Bell’s challenge. Arrogant and petty blame as such need not involve 
UDBDs, so they do not involve an implicit rejection of the very grounding of the 
right to blame. Thus our view shows what any account of the relationship be-
tween hypocrisy and standing must show: what is exceptional about would- be 
hypocritical blame such that it undermines moral standing.
As we will argue, we provide the only plausible extant answer to Bell’s chal-
lenge. In fact, many writers on hypocrisy and hypocritical blame fail even to 
address the challenge. Without an answer to this challenge, their views cannot 
stand as plausible accounts.
2. Wallace’s Equality of Persons View
We are partly indebted to R. Jay Wallace (2010), who understands hypocritical blame 
in terms of unfair exception- making: the hypocritical blamer engages in blaming 
others for faults that he has himself committed without also subjecting himself to 
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blame. Wallace asks, “why exactly is it that we lack standing to blame others for 
things that we do or have done for ourselves?” (2010: 318). Like the answer we offer, 
Wallace’s answer appeals to the fact that the hypocritical blamer violates the prin-
ciple of the equality of persons. We summarize Wallace’s view as follows:
The hypocritical blamer shields herself from the moral criticism involved 
in blame while not doing the same for others. Since we all have an inter-
est in being protected from moral criticism, when the hypocrite blames 
others for faults similar to those for which she is also blameworthy she 
treats others’ interests as less important than her own. In so doing, she 
violates the principle of the equality of persons that is fundamental to 
morality. (Fritz & Miller 2018: 123)
While we agree that Wallace has hit upon what is distinctively objectionable 
about the hypocrisy involved in hypocritical blame, this does not, on its own, an-
swer the challenge Bell offers. In order to do so, one must answer a further ques-
tion (indeed, Bell 2013 has Wallace in mind here): why does the fact that hypoc-
risy is distinctively objectionable in this way imply that the hypocritical blamer 
lacks the standing to blame? Wallace’s explanation does not go far enough; it is 
still missing a step. But as explained above, this is precisely where our account 
bridges the gap: the would- be hypocritical blamer implicitly rejects the equality 
of persons, which is itself the ground of the moral right or standing to blame. In 
rejecting the former, one forfeits the latter.
There is an additional respect in which Wallace’s account is incomplete. Wal-
lace’s explanation depends upon the fact that blame often has negative effects 
(e.g., social disapproval), and that we all have an interest in being protected from 
such effects (2010: 328). But if so, this seems to imply that Wallace’s explanation 
is limited to “cases in which the blamed is aware of or impacted by the blame 
in some way” (Fritz & Miller 2018: 124). Consequently, Wallace’s explanation 
cannot account for instances of private hypocritical blame or other instances of 
hypocritical blame where the agent blamed is not impacted by the blame. So, 
even if Wallace’s explanation did answer Bell’s challenge, it would only do so 
with respect to certain kinds of hypocritical blame. Because our explanation does 
not rely on the impact that blame might have for the agent blamed, but rather 
on how UDBDs involve an implicit rejection of the equality of persons, it is not 
limited in the way that Wallace’s purported explanation is.
3. Roadevin’s Reciprocity View
Cristina Roadevin (2018) claims to offer an account of why hypocritical blame 
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undermines the standing to blame that is rooted in the hypocritical blamer’s 
failure to honor the reciprocal nature of morality.6 Unfortunately, although she 
engages with Bell’s paper, Roadevin neither directly addresses nor meets Bell’s 
challenge.
Like we do, Roadevin understands the hypocritical blamer as making an 
exception of himself without good reason (2018: 143), and she thinks that 
the wrongness of hypocritical blame lies partly in the hypocrite’s attitudes 
toward his own wrongdoing (2018: 145). Similarly, she understands stand-
ing as a right (2018: 137).7 Unlike we do, however, she limits herself to only 
explaining why the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to express blame 
(2018: 138, n. 3), and she is largely concerned with second- personal overt 
blame rather than third- personal cases (2018: 141). By limiting the scope of 
her view so narrowly, Roadevin presents an incomplete view and limits the 
power of her explanation.
Roadevin builds her view around the case of Harvey and Laura. Laura has 
an affair with Harvey’s best friend and lies about her infidelity to Harvey. Yet 
Harvey has also cheated on Laura in the past without apologizing (Roadevin 
2018: 137– 138). As Roadevin tells the case, Harvey hypocritically blames Laura 
for lying about her infidelity.8 Roadevin argues that he consequently lacks the 
standing to blame Laura for her infidelity, offering the following explanation:
What undermines Harvey’s standing to blame Laura is not the fact that 
he is guilty of the same thing but the fact that he culpably fails to observe, 
criticize, and scrutinize his own moral faults while demanding that others 
do. So the badness of hypocrisy can be best explained by a failure of reci-
procity. Why does this typically undermine standing? In blaming Laura, 
Harvey is expecting an apology from her; however, Harvey himself owes 
Laura an apology. As a matter of justice, he needs to clear himself of his 
“moral debt” before he can be in a position to demand an explanation 
from Laura regarding her moral faults. (2018: 148)
6. Though we use the broader term “hypocritical blame” here, Roadevin writes as though it 
is the actual hypocritical blaming that undermines the blamer’s standing to blame (2018: 144). This 
seems to imply that the hypocritical blamer’s standing is undermined only after blaming, and not 
prior to it. One advantage of our dispositional view is that it allows one to explain why an agent 
might lack standing prior to blaming hypocritically.
7. However, Roadevin sometimes fails to distinguish between the claims that the hypocrite 
lacks the standing or right to blame, that the hypocrite should not blame, that the hypocrite’s blame 
would be inappropriate, and that the hypocrite’s blame would be unjustified (2018: 137– 140). These 
claims are not obviously equivalent.
8. It is unclear whether Roadevin intends that Harvey be hypocritical with respect to lying or 
with respect to infidelity. Harvey may well be hypocritical with respect to infidelity, but if he never 
lied about his infidelity to Laura, he is not also hypocritical with respect to lying. We will ignore 
this complication here and assume that Harvey and Laura are guilty of violating the same norm.
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According to Roadevin, hypocritical blame is uniquely bad because it is a fail-
ure of reciprocity, and morality is inherently reciprocal: “the moral interaction 
between us also requires that we pay attention to our own faults and change our 
behavior, especially if we want our demands to be taken seriously when we ask 
others to answer to us” (2018: 147). This is similar to the explanation provided by 
Duff (2010) for why hypocritical blame undermines standing.
This failure of reciprocity is a different sort of fault than those involved in 
arrogant or petty blame. The hypocritical blamer expects the person he blames 
to apologize but has not discharged his own obligation to apologize. But in the 
spirit of Bell, one can ask both Roadevin and Duff, “Why does a failure to recip-
rocate undermine one’s standing to blame? Why must one clear one’s moral debt 
before one can be in a position to blame others?” Roadevin’s explanation as it 
stands does not go far enough.
At times, Roadevin suggests that no more needs to be said. She writes, “The 
main problem with [the hypocrite’s] blame is that he fails to see and understand 
something he should see and understand. He fails to see he is doing something 
he has no right to do” (2018: 147). Yet Roadevin has already assumed here that 
the hypocritical blamer lacks the right to blame without explaining why. Clearly 
the explanation cannot be that the hypocritical blamer lacks the right to blame 
because he fails to see that he lacks the right to blame.
At other times, however, Roadevin seems to implicitly rely on the very ex-
planation that we have already offered. She claims that the hypocritical blamer’s 
failure to critically engage with his own behavior “shows that he does not un-
derstand what is morally significant for our moral interactions— that is, that we 
have to live by the same moral standards we hold others to” (2018: 146). This 
sounds remarkably close to the impartiality of morality and the equality of per-
sons, which we appeal to as the foundation of the standing to blame. On our 
view, the impartiality of morality means that everyone is subject to certain basic 
rights and obligations, and rejecting this requires rejecting the moral equality of 
persons. But the right to blame is grounded in the equality of persons. The result 
is that Roadevin’s explanation is incomplete, and yet our argument provides the 
most salient way to supplement it.
Regardless, Roadevin rejects “equality of persons” views such as Wallace’s 
and ours because she thinks it is possible for one to hypocritically blame while 
respecting a person as having equal interests (2018: 145). As an illustration, she 
alters the case of Harvey and Laura, supposing that Harvey has forgotten that he 
was unfaithful to Laura years ago even as he blames her for her infidelity (2018: 
145– 146). Roadevin imagines that Harvey fully respects Laura’s interests as im-
portant as his, even though he makes an exception of himself.
Presumably Roadevin frames her objection in terms of respecting interests 
because Wallace explains his view in these terms. It is unclear exactly what 
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Roadevin means by “respecting interests,” however. On a weaker understand-
ing, it may merely involve Harvey caring that things go as well for Laura as they 
do for him. But then it is possible for Harvey to respect Laura’s interests even if 
he has a UDBD. Since our view concerns dispositions, it allows that Harvey can 
respect Laura’s interests as equal in this sense while nevertheless being unfairly 
disposed to blame her and not himself for infidelity.
If Roadevin means something stronger, however, such as Harvey actually 
regarding Laura as on par with himself morally speaking, then this is incompat-
ible with having a UDBD. But then everything hinges on a missing detail: Har-
vey’s current dispositions regarding self- blame for infidelity. Harvey may have 
forgotten his infidelity, yet still be unfairly disposed to blame Laura and not 
himself for similar wrongdoing. If so, then he thereby necessarily (albeit implic-
itly) rejects the impartiality of morality as well as the equality of persons with 
respect to that wrongdoing. In that case, it is conceptually incoherent to say that 
he regards Laura as morally equal while having a UDBD. On the other hand, if 
Harvey is now disposed to blame both himself and Laura for similar wrongdo-
ing, but simply fails to blame himself because he forgot he was guilty, then he is 
not a hypocritical blamer on our view. He lacks a UDBD and retains the standing 
to blame Laura for her infidelity (Fritz & Miller 2018: 130).
So whether Harvey can hypocritically blame Laura while equally respecting 
her interests in Roadevin’s case depends on how we understand these interests. 
On a weaker reading, “respecting interests” is compatible with having a UDBD, 
and on a stronger reading it is not. If Harvey has a UDBD, he cannot equally 
respect Laura’s interests in the stronger sense, but if he does not, then he can re-
spect such interests because his blame is not hypocritical at all. Even if Roadevin 
creates a problem for Wallace’s equality of persons view, there is no good reason 
to reject our view or the equality of persons as the foundation of the standing to 
blame. In fact, this equality is the deeper explanation needed to properly explain 
why a failure of reciprocity might undermine standing.
One last remark may push Roadevin even closer to adopting our view. She 
holds that whether an individual is hypocritical in blaming another “will depend 
on how he responds to her when he is confronted” (Roadevin 2018: 147). Yet we 
can imagine that an individual is never confronted. This would seem to imply 
that someone can avoid being hypocritical (and thereby preserve his own stand-
ing) simply by avoiding interactions with someone who might confront him. It 
would be bizarre if Roadevin intended to claim that such an individual was not 
hypocritical after all, as though being guilty for this moral fault depends upon 
whether someone calls him out for it. Presumably, Roadevin wants to adopt a 
dispositional sort of account like ours, where being hypocritical with respect to 
blaming depends on how one is disposed to behave toward oneself and others 
and what attitudes one is disposed to have towards oneself and others. But if she 
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does this, while adding the necessary supplement of the equality of persons to 
answer Bell’s challenge, there is very little daylight between an altered version of 
Roadevin’s view and our own.
4. Isserow and Klein’s Moral Authority View
Jessica Isserow and Colin Klein attempt to uncover “what hypocrites have in 
common, or what is distinctively bad about them” (2017: 191). While this is not 
explicitly tackling Bell’s challenge, it is closely related. One might think that 
whatever is distinctively bad about hypocrisy could explain why hypocritical 
blame, but not arrogant or petty blame, is standingless blame.
On their view, “hypocrites are persons who have, by mismatch between judg-
ments and actions, undermined their claim to moral authority” (2017: 193, empha-
sis original). For Isserow and Klein, an agent’s moral authority is “a kind of 
standing that they occupy within a particular moral community— a status that 
is intimately tied up with their capacity to (1) warrant esteem, and (2) bestow 
(dis)esteem on others” (2017: 193). Thus, when moral authorities exercise con-
demnation, their condemnation has an illocutionary force for their communities 
(2017: 198), and this is what the hypocrite’s condemnation lacks in virtue of the 
mismatch.9
Whatever the merits of Isserow and Klein’s account, one might protest that 
moral authority and moral standing are distinct. After all, Isserow and Klein 
describe their target as “social standing” (2017: 200), so it seems they are simply 
not interested in addressing Bell’s challenge. Ultimately, we agree. But crucially, 
Isserow and Klein set themselves up as if they were in the same conversation, 
discussing Wallace as among their “rival accounts” (2017: 193) and sometimes 
referring to standing as “entitlement” (2017: 202). This is a mistake. Bell’s chal-
lenge concerns a moral right, and having a moral right to blame need not be 
connected with the illocutionary force of one’s speech act. After all, one can have 
or lack the right to privately blame, but only overt expressed blame can have illo-
cutionary force.10 Additionally, one might have the moral right to feel or express 
resentment, even if one’s resentment lacks illocutionary force. Finally, having a 
9. Isserow and Klein are careful to emphasize that a hypocrite need not have actually func-
tioned as a moral authority. A hypocrite is rather one who has lost his claim to moral authority 
(2017: 205). One might say that, on Isserow and Klein’s view, the hypocrite is (whether he was 
previously a moral authority or not) disqualified to function as a moral authority because of the 
relevant mismatch.
10. This reveals that Isserow and Klein’s view has the same limitation that Wallace’s and 
Roadevin’s views have. Interestingly, Patrick Todd has the complimentary shortcoming. He is 
concerned only with the right to feel blame and does not aim to discuss the right to express blame 
(2019: 350).
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moral right to blame need not require one’s having a special position of moral 
authority in the community.
Ultimately, then, Isserow and Klein may explain why hypocrites lack a place 
of moral reverence in society and why we do not take their criticisms or con-
demnations seriously, but they cannot answer Bell’s challenge and explain why 
hypocrites lack the moral right to either express or even feel blame for those of-
fenses with respect to which they are hypocritical.
Though they do not answer Bell’s challenge, Isserow and Klein raise im-
portant worries for views with features similar to ours, so we should address 
some of them here. The first worry concerns dispositional accounts of hypocrisy. 
Isserow and Klein maintain that “many accounts have . . . gone astray by as-
suming that hypocrisy amounts to a kind of settled disposition” (2017: 193). In 
particular, some such accounts fail to adequately capture
everyday attributions of hypocrisy; for these certainly do not appear to 
be restricted to those with a settled disposition to take morality insuf-
ficiently seriously. . . . It seems implausible to us that hypocrisy as it op-
erates in day- to- day life amounts to a full- fledged character trait. (2017: 
216)
If Isserow and Klein simply maintain that one can be a hypocrite with re-
spect to some norm without having a bad character, we can happily agree. While 
we analyze a hypocritical blamer as one who has an unfair differential blam-
ing disposition, we are not committed to the view that such dispositions must 
be settled character traits. Rather, like other dispositions, UDBDs can be quite 
finely grained, and need not have any lengthy temporal duration. One may be 
disposed to become angry at others but not oneself only when it comes to a very 
particular fault. One may also slip into hypocritical blame when in a particularly 
defensive or vulnerable mood, but quickly snap out of it when shown the error 
of one’s ways.
Furthermore, a dispositional account of hypocritical blame has distinct ad-
vantages. It is able to explain why would- be hypocritical blamers lack the stand-
ing to blame before they engage in actual hypocritical blame, since the hypocrite 
may nevertheless be disposed to blame others but not himself (and thus already 
implicitly reject the equality of persons). A dispositional account of hypocriti-
cal blame can also explain how a hypocritical blamer can regain the standing to 
blame, even if he never addresses a past fault, perhaps since he forgot about it 
(Fritz & Miller 2018: 129ff.). If the hypocritical blamer comes to have the right 
dispositions toward himself and others with respect to the relevant norm (such 
that he would appropriately address his fault were it to be brought back to mem-
ory), then he regains the standing to blame for violations of that norm.
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Isserow and Klein raise an additional objection for views that explain the 
hypocrite’s lack of standing by appealing to the hypocrite’s rejection of the 
equality of persons. They focus on Wallace’s view in particular:
Although [Wallace’s] account works naturally for moral communities 
who think that people are fundamentally equal from a moral point of 
view, charges of hypocrisy arise even in societies with no such commit-
ment. The seventeenth- century Catholic Church, for example, was hardly 
egalitarian— yet audiences at the time recognized Tartuffe as a hypocrite 
all the same. Hence, even people who are not committed to something 
like the equality of persons can clearly recognize and condemn hypoc-
risy. This is something that Wallace’s account seems to have trouble ac-
commodating. (Isserow & Klein 2017: 215)
While Wallace focuses on hypocritical blame, his account does not restrict him 
from acknowledging other types of hypocrites or recognizing that hypocrisy is 
broader than hypocritical blame. At the outset, Wallace writes, “I shall try to 
distinguish the objectionable form of hypocrisy, which I shall refer to as hypo-
critical moral address, from other forms of hypocrisy that are not objectionable in 
the same way” (2010: 308, emphasis added). Wallace is concerned with isolating 
one kind of hypocrisy that is particularly morally objectionable. Isserow and 
Klein themselves recognize this intentional focus on Wallace’s part (2017: 213). 
Likewise, we acknowledge other kinds of hypocrisy, but restrict our discussion 
to a sort of “exception- seeking” hypocrite who rejects the equality of persons.11
Consider Tartuffe, who is mentioned as a problematic example of hypocrisy 
for such accounts. Tartuffe “pretends to be pious for reasons of self- advancement. 
His hypocrisy does not consist in a single bout of inconsistency (of the relevant 
sort), but in a rather extensive pattern of deception” (2017: 210). Neither Wallace 
nor we need to deny that there is a type of hypocrisy that involves false pretense. 
Thus, even a society that rejects the equality of persons might be able to “recog-
nize and condemn” this sort of hypocrisy.
If this is right, Isserow and Klein cannot be criticizing Wallace (and others) 
for their inability merely to recognize and condemn other sorts of agents that may 
11. We write that other types of hypocrites “do not count as hypocrites in the way we discuss 
hypocrites here” and that, of the kinds of hypocrites listed by Bell (2013), “the third kind Bell de-
scribes (‘exception- seeking hypocrites’) is the closest to displaying the kind of hypocrisy that we 
believe to undermine the standing to blame” (2018: 135, n. 8, emphasis added). Nevertheless, we 
are guilty of a misstep when we write that “the hypocrite is willing to blame others for faults but 
unwilling to blame herself for similar faults” (2018: 121) and “hypocrisy fundamentally involves 
the nature of an agent’s disposition to blame because it reflects how the agent regards herself and 
others” (2018: 122). Instead, given that we are largely focused on offering a response to Bell’s chal-
lenge, our account of hypocrisy should be restricted to being hypocritical with respect to blame.
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count as hypocrites. It seems that their criticism must be that accounts that ex-
plain undermined standing of hypocritical blamers by appealing to the equality 
of persons cannot in a unified way explain the undermined standing of other 
types of agents that Isserow and Klein recognize as hypocrites. This is because it 
is one thing to be able to recognize and condemn the various moral faults of these 
agents, and quite another to maintain that all such agents lack standing because 
of these faults. But, we do not wish to commit ourselves to the view that all kinds 
of hypocrites lack the standing to blame, and neither does Wallace. Rather, we 
both aim to offer an account of why certain types of hypocrites (i.e., hypocritical 
blamers) lack the standing to blame in virtue of rejecting the equality of persons. 
But hypocrites like Tartuffe are not hypocritical blamers. Tartuffe may be guilty 
of deception and false pretense, but we maintain that he does not actually blame 
others for such violations, nor is he even disposed to do so. Rather, he merely 
pretends to blame. He does not care about the norms he violates or whether oth-
ers violate them, and he experiences no reactive attitudes in response. Since we 
are concerned with why hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame, and 
deceptive hypocrites like Tartuffe are not even disposed to blame, we have a 
principled reason for holding that deceptive hypocrites do not lack the standing 
to do what they are not even disposed to do.12
While Isserow and Klein have offered a convincing case for why all hypo-
crites may lack a claim to a special kind of moral authority (i.e., one that para-
digmatically involves esteem), there simply is no plausible case that all types of 
hypocrites lack the moral right to feel or express anger or indignation. Consider 
a weak- willed agent, such as a PETA advocate who occasionally eats bacon (cf. 
Isserow & Klein 2017: 200ff.). She feels awful afterward and blames herself, sin-
cerely desiring never to eat bacon again, and she admits to others that she is 
weak- willed and sometimes falls short of her own moral ideals. This agent has a 
mismatch that makes her hypocritical according to Isserow and Klein, so she ap-
parently lacks the relevant moral authority (2017: 201– 202). Yet, this weak- willed 
agent does not make an exception of herself or reject the equality of persons; she 
is disposed to hold herself to the same standards to which she holds others.13 
As a result, we see no reason why such an agent, even if hypocritical, lacks the 
moral right to feel or express anger or indignation in response to others eating 
meat. And our account is no worse for the wear if it lacks an implication that is 
12. Benjamin Rossi (2018) has recently criticized our view on similar grounds, arguing that 
we cannot explain why all types of hypocrites lack the standing to blame. We defend against Ros-
si’s criticism in more detail in Fritz and Miller (2019). In our response, we point out that hypocrites 
like Tartuffe may lack standing in a counterfactual sense: if they were disposed to blame, they would 
(supposing they were still hypocritical) lack the standing to do so.
13. We are not even inclined to think of such a weak- willed blamer as hypocritical at all, but 
we set aside this point here.
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plausibly false (i.e., that all the types of agents that Isserow and Klein count as 
hypocrites lack standing).
Finally, Isserow and Klein claim that
The blame- centered account also struggles with cases that do not involve 
two people. As noted above, countries and organizations can accuse and 
be accused of hypocrisy. Yet it is not at all obvious that nations, corpora-
tions, and political parties have reactive attitudes, or that they are the 
proper targets of reactive attitudes, or even that they are capable of the 
kinds of propositional attitudes that Wallace’s account requires. (2017: 
215)
Crucially, Isserow and Klein’s account has an advantage here only if there are 
group agents that can make pronouncements and act (or fail to act) in certain 
ways. And, if there are such group agents, then they will plausibly also be ca-
pable of relevant analogues of blaming attitudes, such as holding responsible, 
punishing, and other forms of sanction. But then accounts like Wallace’s and our 
own plausibly can account for the hypocrisy of group agents. If group agents can 
act, make pronouncements or maintain judgments, fail to behave according to 
them, and so on, then presumably such group agents will also be able to make 
unfair exceptions of themselves, thus implicitly rejecting the moral equality on 
which their right to hold responsible rests.
5. Todd’s Bedrock View
Like the above authors, Patrick Todd (2019) maintains that hypocritical blame 
undermines an agent’s standing to blame.14 However, Todd restricts himself to 
what he calls the “basic moral standing to blame,” which is the standing to “feel 
blame” rather than to “express blame” (2019: 350). In contrast, Wallace, Road-
evin, and Isserow and Klein are focused on overt blame. In narrowing the ques-
tion in this way, Todd risks shifting the topic or not engaging with interlocutors 
on their terms.
Even with this restriction, Todd maintains that there is no explanation of 
why the would- be hypocritical blamer lacks the basic standing to blame. In ad-
dressing the question, Todd answers, “he just does” (2019: 371). In other words, 
it is a bedrock moral fact that would- be hypocritical blame undermines one’s 
standing to blame. It is worthwhile to restate Bell’s more specific challenge here: 
14. Like we do, Todd clearly maintains that would- be hypocritical blame undermines the 
standing to blame (2019: 348).
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other types of faults (e.g., meanness, pettiness, arrogance) do not undermine an 
agent’s standing to blame. So, what is so special about hypocrisy such that would- 
be hypocritical blame does? Todd does not address this more focused challenge; 
indeed, if Todd’s view is correct, then the challenge simply has no answer.
Todd’s stance depends partly on his rejection of our answer to Bell’s chal-
lenge, claiming that it proves too much. He highlights, as we acknowledge, that 
certain inconsistent blamers also implicitly reject the equality of persons, and 
therefore lack the standing to blame for the same reason that would- be hypo-
critical blamers do. We describe Olivia, who is enamored with Paige. Although 
Olivia is disposed to blame herself and others for lying, she is not disposed to 
blame Paige for lying given how enamored she is with Paige (2018: 132). Because 
Olivia has a UDBD with respect to blaming for violations of the norm against 
lying, she implicitly rejects the equality of persons with respect to violations of 
this norm and thereby forfeits her right to blame for lying.
Todd sees this as a fatal flaw.15 In his imagined case, a terrorist responsible 
for the 2016 attack on Pulse nightclub in Orlando attempts to deflect the blame 
of a US citizen by pointing out that the citizen is disposed to blame inconsis-
tently. Whereas people in the US are disposed to blame terrorists for attacks in 
Paris and Orlando, they are not so disposed to blame terrorists who perpetrate 
attacks in Turkey throughout 2016. According to Todd, we are committed to the 
claim that such US citizens lack the standing to blame terrorists for any of their 
attacks— whether in Orlando, Paris, or Turkey— because they are not consistent-
ly disposed to blame all these terrorists.
We will argue that Todd is too hasty in dismissing our view. Once we look 
at the details of Todd’s case and our view, it becomes far less clear whether our 
view really implies that the inconsistent blamer Todd describes lacks the stand-
ing to blame all such terrorists, or that it has the fatal flaw Todd suggests.
5.1. Types of Inconsistent Blamers
Importantly, we recognize two different types of inconsistent blamers (Fritz & 
Miller 2018: 132– 133). The first type, which we call Type A, is inconsistent with 
respect to blaming for violations of N due to a UDBD with respect to violations 
of N. The second type, which we call Type B, is inconsistent with respect to 
blaming, but not due to any underlying general reason concerning how she re-
gards persons. Her inconsistency is due to other factors: perhaps she is forget-
ful, inattentive, tired, distracted, unaware, etc. As with hypocritical blame, we 
15. What Todd finds clearly objectionable others might not. Notably, Cohen suggests that 
the force of tu quoque is related to inconsistency: “Suppose A and B have both committed the same 
crime, but I indignantly condemn A only. Isn’t my condemnation of A suspect, unless I can supply 
a pertinent distinction between A and B?” (2012: 138).
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can make a distinction between would- be inconsistent blamers and actual in-
consistent blamers. Type A inconsistent blamers are either would- be or actual 
inconsistent blamers in virtue of having a UDBD. Type B inconsistent blamers 
are either would- be or actual inconsistent blamers whose inconsistency does not 
result from a UDBD, but from some other factor.16
We argue that Type A blamers lack the standing to blame for violations of N 
for the same reason that the would- be hypocritical blamers do. Type B blamers, 
however, do not have any disposition that involves an implicit rejection of the 
equality of persons with respect to violations of N, and so do not lose standing 
on that basis.17
Are the inconsistent blamers in Todd’s case Type A or Type B blamers? The 
case lacks sufficient detail for us to answer. While western news media covers 
terrorist attacks, they did not cover attacks in Turkey with the depth and atten-
tion that they did the Paris or Orlando attacks. This leaves open the possibility 
that many US citizens were simply unaware of the issue or of how devastating 
the attacks were (perhaps culpably, though this is a separate issue). For all we 
are told, then, the inconsistent blamers Todd describes might be of Type B. If so, 
their standing would not be undermined, since they are not inconsistently blam-
ing as a result of some UDBD.
Of course, Todd is free to stipulate that the inconsistent blamers in his 
case are of Type A. But this raises two further questions: Is it so counterin-
tuitive or unacceptable that Type A blamers lack the standing to blame the 
terrorists for their attacks? And how common are such blamers? These are 
16. We will use “inconsistent blamer” generally throughout this section, though the context 
of various passages should be sufficient to clarify whether the individual in question is actually 
blaming.
17. Todd is aware of this distinction, yet he claims, “we can see that it is no part of having the 
standing to blame that one is perfectly disposed to exercise that standing fairly” (2019: 370). While 
we never claim that one must be so perfectly disposed, the following passage may be the source 
of some confusion: “Though [the Type B blamer’s] blame is inconsistent, this particular type of 
inconsistency does not arise from any differential blaming dispositions. He does not reject the 
impartiality of morality . . .” (2018: 133). Although we are not sufficiently clear here, the context 
of this passage makes it clearer that what is crucial is that this second type of inconsistent blamer 
does not have an unfair DBD, or UDBD, terminology not adopted in that paper.
Shortly before the above passage we write, “We maintain that the fact that there is no jus-
tifiable basis for the differential nature of the hypocrite’s blaming disposition is the reason why 
the hypocrite’s DBD is an instance of unfair exception- making that contravenes the equality of 
persons” (2018: 132, emphasis added). We leave it open that the Type B blamer’s failure to blame 
consistently is due to either (i) some imperfect disposition to blame (though not grounded in un-
equal regard) or (ii) a disposition to blame consistently that is prevented from manifesting due to 
some other factor (e.g., forgetfulness, inattentiveness, etc.). Our view does not imply that the Type 
B blamer loses the standing to blame in either case. We maintain that, whatever explains why the 
Type B blamer fails to blame consistently, it is not due to a rejection of the impartiality of morality 
or the equality of persons (in contrast with Type A blamers). Thus, we leave it open that there are 
justifiable reasons for differential blaming in certain cases (2018: 213, n. 13).
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related. If such blamers are common, then we must accept that hardly anyone 
will have the standing to blame others. This sort of implication seems coun-
terintuitive, and others, such as Bell (2013), use it to reject conditions on the 
standing to blame.
In response to the first question, we do not find it counterintuitive that Type 
A blamers lack the standing to blame the terrorists for their attacks— even in 
Todd’s case. If the inconsistent blamer in Todd’s case is of Type A, then presum-
ably the inconsistency in her blame involves regarding the killing of US citizens 
or Westerners as somehow worse than killing Turkish citizens or Middle East-
erners.18 Someone who rejects the equality of persons by regarding the murder 
of citizens of one nationality or ethnicity as a more serious wrong than the mur-
der of citizens of another nationality or ethnicity does seem to lack the standing 
to blame a terrorist who murders citizens. If one’s moral compass is so skewed 
that one regards other persons as morally unequal in virtue of their nationality 
or ethnicity, it does not sound so odd that such a person lacks the moral right to 
hold the terrorist accountable.
The claim that Type A blamers lack the standing to blame is further support-
ed by the fact that it is commonplace to regard inconsistent blaming as analo-
gous to hypocrisy, especially in politics (Fritz 2019: 322– 323). For example, many 
conservative news outlets accused late- night talk show hosts of being hypocriti-
cal in not publicly blaming Harvey Weinstein for his alleged sexual assault and 
misconduct when they were so eager to blame Donald Trump, Bill O’Reilly, and 
other conservatives for allegations of sexual assault (Hanson 2017). On the other 
side of the aisle, Hillary Clinton has called the Trump administration’s use of 
private email accounts for government business “the height of hypocrisy,” given 
how willing they were to blame her for using such an account (Rawlinson & 
Pengelly 2017). So, if hypocrisy undermines standing, and Type A blamers are 
relevantly analogous (as they are commonly taken to be), then the claim that 
Type A blamers lack standing is not implausible after all.
In any case, it is unclear how prevalent these kinds of Type A blamers are. 
Those who initially seem like Type A blamers might turn out, upon inspection, 
not to be Type A blamers after all. Consider the evidence that Todd’s terrorist 
cites in his speech. He says that although many US citizens blamed terrorists 
for attacks in Orlando and Paris, they “hardly seemed to notice” the attacks in 
Turkey: “There was no general outpouring of grief for those who lost their lives, 
18. On this way of interpreting the case, the Type A blamer is disposed to blame two viola-
tors of N inconsistently because of who their respective victims are. If one thinks the victim of one 
wrongdoer matters less given who they are, for instance, then one might think that that wrongdo-
er’s violation of N is less wrong and therefore that less blame is deserved in this case. Alternatively, 
a Type A blamer might be disposed to blame one violator of N and not another because of who 
the violator is. (This is the sort of Type A blamer we have in mind in Fritz & Miller 2018: 131– 132.)
 The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame • 563
Ergo • vol. 6, no. 19 • 2019
and no corresponding public anger with those who saw fit to take them” (Todd 
2019: 369).19
There are a host of plausible reasons to explain this difference in overt blame 
that make no appeal to a UDBD. Perhaps US citizens did not express their emo-
tions because they do not feel as strong of a connection with the people of Tur-
key. Humans have limited emotional resources and, for better or worse, we tend 
to be devoted to those with whom we feel a closer relationship.20 We need not 
see this as a rejection of the moral equality of persons. A father need not re-
ject the moral equality of persons when he feels more affinity toward his own 
child than a stranger’s child. And a mother is not unfairly inconsistently blaming 
when she publicly lashes out at a drunk driver who hits her child, even though 
she feels only a bit of indignation toward a drunk driver who hits the child of 
another person she reads about in the news.
Furthermore, even if US citizens lacked the emotional resources to be exer-
cised enough to experience blame, they may still have been disposed to blame 
the terrorists consistently. So, simply because there was no public outcry over 
Turkey in the same way that there was over Orlando and Paris does not mean 
that US citizens had UDBDs. Similarly, the appearance of inconsistency does not 
establish a rejection of the equality of persons. Type A blamers who are disposed 
to blame inconsistently due to a UDBD rather than due to a lack of emotional 
resources, for instance, are likely rarer than one might think at first blush.
Even if Type A blamers are rare, the implication that Type A blamers lack the 
standing to blame may still seem counterintuitive. First, one might take this to 
imply that Type A blamers are as bad as hypocritical blamers. Indeed, Todd’s re-
luctance to accept inconsistent blame as undermining standing could be rooted 
in the thought that hypocrisy is a worse fault than inconsistency. Todd envisions 
the terrorist accusing his imaginary interlocutor of hypocrisy by supporting the 
United States government, which itself engages in terrorism (2019: 370). Todd 
suggests that this speech is more challenging. But we can accept this. Perhaps it 
is worse to make an exception of yourself rather than of someone else, and this is 
why hypocrisy is a worse fault. As we write, “Although our view implies that the 
19. It is odd that Todd’s terrorist focuses on overt expressions of blame in attempting to deter-
mine whether US citizens have the standing to blame. As noted above, Todd narrows his focus to 
the “basic” standing to blame, or the standing to “feel” blame rather than “express” blame (2019: 
350). It is possible that US citizens did experience indignation and moral anger upon learning of 
the attacks, but did not express those attitudes. Nevertheless, one might take the expression of 
blame as evidence that US citizens blamed the Orlando and Paris terrorists more than the Turkey 
terrorists. Though we have been focusing on inconsistent blamers who are unfairly disposed to 
blame one person and not another for violations of N, one might also be an inconsistent blamer 
if one is unfairly disposed to blame one person more than another for violations of N. We have 
ignored this complication of inconsistency in degree of blaming for ease of exposition.
20. Sher (2006: 89) also acknowledges this, though for a different purpose.
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hypocrite and inconsistent blamer each lack standing, it doesn’t entail that their 
faults are equally morally objectionable” (2018: 132).
Second, the view that Type A blamers lack the standing to blame may be tak-
en to imply that Type A blamers can never have the standing to blame. However, 
we emphasize that individuals can regain the standing to blame (2018: 130). Sup-
pose that a Type A blamer recognizes that she has no good reason for blaming 
the terrorists for Paris and not for Turkey. If in recognizing her fault she sheds 
her UDBD, she now has the standing to blame the terrorists for both the Paris 
attack and the Turkey attack.
To review, Todd argues that our account has the counterintuitive implica-
tion that the inconsistent blamer would lack the standing to blame the terrorists 
in his imagined case. However, this is true only if the inconsistent blamer is a 
Type A blamer, in which case (we have argued) the implication is not counterin-
tuitive after all. Furthermore, our view implies neither that inconsistent blame is 
as bad as hypocritical blame nor that such an agent cannot regain the standing 
to blame. In light of these considerations, Todd’s criticisms of our account no 
longer seem forceful.
5.2. Methodological Concerns
The way Todd attempts to dismiss our view is itself suspect. First, much of the 
force of his argument comes from the intuition that the terrorist has some special 
moral authority over us, such that we are silenced because of his speech:
Unless we can answer the charge of being improperly differential in our 
dispositions to blame, must we simply walk away in silence after such 
a speech? Are we, effectively, silenced by the terrorists on the grounds 
that we do not react so negatively to other’s [sic] terrorism? . . . Frankly 
it seems bizarre to suppose that a terrorist may silence our criticism on 
grounds that we are— even wrongfully— not as disposed to blame others 
for their terrorism as we are now disposed to blame him for his. (2019: 369, 
emphasis original)
Todd’s own italics suggest that part of what is so disturbing about this speech 
is that a terrorist, of all people, apparently has the authority to silence us in our 
blame.
On our view, people do not lose standing on the basis of the moral demands 
of others; they lose it simply because they have UDBDs. If we lack standing, ac-
cording to our view, then we lack the standing before and independently of any 
such speech, and regardless of who makes it. It is worth asking whether the same 
speech can be made by a different individual rather than the terrorist while still 
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having the same intuitive force. After all, the only role the terrorist plays here is 
to say something that is purportedly true. All that matters is what the terrorist 
points out, not that it is a terrorist who points it out.21
Todd’s use of the terrorist making the speech seems to be an unfair intuition 
pump that contaminates the case. Indeed, throughout his paper Todd largely ap-
peals to intuitions and imagined conversations between imaginary interlocutors. 
While these intuition pumps and conversations are a useful first step in making 
an argument, they should pave the way for a more structured or detailed argu-
ment, and this is precisely what Todd fails to offer.
As laid out in Section 1, we offer an argument for the conclusion that the 
would- be hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame for certain norm viola-
tions (2018: 125). A parallel argument also goes through for the Type A inconsis-
tent blamer, who also has a UDBD.
Essentially, Todd attempts to dismiss our view via a reductio: if our view has 
this purportedly absurd conclusion, it must be false. Above we have shown that 
it is not at all clear that our view has the absurd conclusion Todd thinks, and that 
the implications that our view may have are not very counterintuitive after all. 
Yet if an argument’s conclusion does have a false or implausible implication, one 
should return to the argument and determine which premise should be rejected. 
Given that our argument is valid, the conclusion is false only if one of the prem-
ises is false. Yet Todd does not tell us which premise he rejects or why.
Although he does not engage with the argument, Todd claims that our ac-
count goes wrong in its failure to distinguish between “lacking a right (or an 
entitlement) and being disposed to exercise that right (or entitlement) unfairly” 
(2019: 370). Todd describes two colleagues, Ellie and Suilin, who fail to respond 
to emails in a timely fashion (though Todd himself is prompt in responding to 
emails). When Todd confronts Ellie about her lack of response to an email, she 
could claim that Todd is not disposed to blame Suilin as well, so he has no right 
to blame her. Alternatively, she could claim that Todd is not disposed to blame 
Suilin, so he is exercising his right unfairly. The second response, says Todd, is 
stronger (2019: 370).
It is unclear what Todd’s complaint is. One possible interpretation is that 
Todd believes that we hold the following view:
21. Notably, an anonymous referee for Noûs makes a similar point, which Todd acknowl-
edges in a footnote. The referee suggests that a genuinely concerned third party making the speech 
seems to have more merit. Todd simply disagrees without offering an explanation— perhaps as-
suming that the intuition pump works the same in both cases. But it is not at all obvious that it 
does, and if it does, it would be more responsible to use the third party without italics to elicit the 
same intuition.
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DE: Being disposed to exercise one’s right to blame unfairly entails that 
one lacks the right to blame.
DE is incoherent: it implies that one could simultaneously have the right to blame 
and also not have that right. Yet we do not endorse DE, but this view:
DB: Being disposed to blame unfairly entails that one lacks the right to 
blame.
DB is perfectly coherent. Compare the following two claims:
(1)  Unless one is disposed to exercise one’s moral right to administer 
capital punishment fairly, one does not have the moral right to ad-
minister capital punishment.
(2)  Unless one is disposed to administer capital punishment fairly, one 
does not have the moral right to administer capital punishment.
While (2) is plausible, (1) is not. And (2) is analogous to DB. So if Todd under-
stands our view as DE rather than DB, he simply misunderstands our view.22
In any case, Todd does not explain how the distinction between lacking a 
right and being disposed to exercise that right fairly bears on the truth of one of 
the premises of our argument. (And given that our view is DB, not DE, it is not 
clear why this is where we go wrong, if we do.) In fact, we can happily acknowl-
edge this general distinction. However, we offer an argument for the claim that, 
when it comes to the right to blame, the latter entails the former: the disposition 
to blame unfairly entails the lack of the right to blame.
Todd has not explained why (or how) one could have the standing or right 
to blame even though one is unfairly disposed to blame. We have given a valid 
argument showing that in having an unfair differential disposition to blame one 
thereby forfeits the right to blame. Thus, Todd has given no reason to reject our 
argument or view.
5.3. The Shortcomings of Todd’s View
There are good reasons to reject Todd’s own view. According to Todd, “one has 
standing if and only if one is morally committed to the values that condemn the 
wrongdoer’s actions” (2019: 357). Todd does not clearly explain what a com-
mitment to morality involves. All he offers is that “the sort of commitment at 
22. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possible confusion and for offering 
the helpful capital punishment example here.
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issue . . . consists, minimally, in endorsement of the value as a genuine value, 
together with at least some degree of motivation to act in accordance with the 
value” (2019: 355). There are two problems with this understanding.
First, the hypocritical blamer can be committed to morality in the way Todd 
requires. The hypocritical blamer’s blame (unless it is hollow or fake) involves a 
normative or value judgment that requires an endorsement of the relevant norm 
or value. Furthermore, nothing precludes the hypocritical blamer from having 
“at least some degree of motivation to act in accordance with the value,” even 
if she never in fact does. Since the hypocritical blamer can meet Todd’s minimal 
requirements, Todd has failed to identify a sufficient condition on standing. Pre-
sumably, Todd thinks that whatever commitment the hypocritical blamer may 
have to the relevant value is insufficient. But then he needs to further develop his 
account to specify what degree or kind of commitment to morality is sufficient 
for having the standing to blame.
Second, there is nothing about the nature of the Type A inconsistent blamer 
that involves a greater commitment to morality than the hypocritical blamer. 
They both are what they are in virtue of a UDBD— a disposition to unfairly make 
exceptions in their blaming. For this reason, both the hypocritical blamer and the 
Type A inconsistent blamer can endorse some value and be motivated to uphold 
it to some degree. Todd’s view seems to imply that whatever kind of lack of com-
mitment to morality it is that undermines the hypocritical blamer’s standing to 
blame (supposing he specifies what exactly this is) will do the same for Type A 
inconsistent blamers. Ironically, this implication is the very reason that he rejects 
our account of why would- be hypocritical blame undermines the standing to 
blame. In order to avoid this implication, Todd must explain why the hypocriti-
cal blamer’s lack of commitment to morality is relevantly different from that of 
the Type A inconsistent blamer.
After rejecting our grounding for the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, 
Todd admits that he has no explanation or grounding for the condition himself, 
and consequently no answer to Bell’s challenge. The reason Todd lacks an ex-
planation seems obvious. He has not identified the right feature to explain the 
unique badness of hypocritical blame. No one is perfectly committed to morality 
in the right way, as Todd points out. Yet we do explain the sort of commitment 
to morality that is required: respect for the moral equality of persons. This expla-
nation can do the deeper work required and it is more illuminating than Todd’s 
deflated answer, which we imagine many will find unsatisfying.
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6. Conclusion
As we have seen, though several accounts aim to explain how or why hypocrisy 
can undermine the standing to blame, only our account provides a plausible 
explanation. While some have attempted to cast doubt on the viability of our 
view, such attempts fall short. Rejecting the equality of persons with respect to 
some norm is necessarily a constitutive part of would- be hypocritical blame for 
violations of that norm, and thus provides the fundamental explanation for why 
the would- be hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame for violations of 
that norm. Crucially, our argument does not have the counterintuitive implica-
tions Todd suggests. Only inconsistent blamers of a very special sort will lack 
the standing to blame, and this result fits well with our intuitions and everyday 
practices. As a result, ours remains the best account on offer.
Of course, the best account on offer is not necessarily the correct one. Per-
haps a better account is forthcoming.23 But this will be challenging. Offering an 
alternative to our account requires at least two tasks. First, one must show which 
premise in our argument is false and why. One might think, for instance, that the 
right to blame is not grounded in the equality of persons. To make a compelling 
case, however, one would have to explain what grounds the right to blame if not 
the equality of persons. Second, one must offer an alternative positive account 
that answers Bell’s challenge and explains why hypocritical blame is standing-
less blame. Given the power of our argument, this alternative must either do a 
better job accounting for the facts or have fewer (or less problematic) counterin-
tuitive implications. Without any such alternative, one should prefer our view.
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